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When the United States Congress enacted the first “antitrust” law in 
1890 it was taking a shot in the dark. 
At the time there was no concept of 
“antitrust law”—i.e., a general le-
gal regime intended to combat re-
straints on competition. Today more 
than 100 countries have such laws, 
including all significant participants 
in the global economy. Competition 
law has become a major factor in eco-
nomic life throughout much of the 
world. U.S. antitrust law has played 
a central role in this remarkable evo-
lution, and it is generally acknowl-
edged to be the most important of 
these laws. It is the touchstone and 
frame of reference for international 
discussions, and it is often used as 
a model or at least a major source 
of guidance by other countries in 
developing their own competition 
laws. The story is extraordinary, in-
terwoven with the roles of power 
and ideas and intertwined with the 
evolution of the U.S. and its role in 
the world. This brief essay sketches 
its trajectory. Chicago-Kent’s role as 
an educational institution tracks that 
trajectory.
David J. Gerber
U.S. ANTITRUST: FROM SHOT IN THE 
DARK TO GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
“The fog,” Puck cartoon by Will Crawford, 1911, Library of Congress.
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I. A Shot in the Dark
This new type of legislation was a “shot in the dark” in the sense 
that few, if any, of the legislators had 
any way of knowing what conse-
quences the legislation would have. 
They were “shooting” at something, 
but they didn’t know what they 
might actually hit. So what were they 
trying to do and why?
Antitrust law was, above all, a 
response to social turbulence and 
tensions. The United States in the 
1880s presented a complex mixture 
of hope, fear and resentments. The 
terrible Civil War was a memory, 
but not a distant one. Rapid indus-
trialization was creating great wealth 
for a few and jobs for many. Immi-
gration was bringing millions from 
Europe to take those jobs and to find 
land to farm in the Midwest and the 
West. Yet the rapid changes also gen-
erated sectional conflicts and social 
tensions, and political and legal  in-
stitutions strained to respond effec-
tively to them.
This mixture of pressures, con-
flicts and resentments led Congress 
to enact what came to be known as 
antitrust law. One key background 
factor was the resentment that many 
felt towards the new super rich and 
their lavish and ostentatious life-
styles. Located primarily in New 
York and other cities on the East 
Coast, these groups had achieved 
great wealth quickly, often through 
control of large manufacturing busi-
nesses. These firms often dominated 
specific industries, and this domi-
nance allowed them to exclude new 
entrants from those industries. It 
also allowed them to extract what 
many viewed as unfair prices and 
conditions on their suppliers as well 
as their employees. This led to an-
ger at the power of these so-called 
“trusts” and often combined with 
anger at the power of their owners 
to control the destinies and stifle 
the possibilities of others, especially 
those in other parts of the country. 
A specific catalyst for antitrust law 
was rising anger among Midwestern 
farming communities at what they 
saw as rapacious and monopolistic 
conduct by railroad companies and 
others whom they believed were 
manipulating prices paid to farm-
ers for their grain and livestock. 
Groups representing these interests 
pressured their representatives in 
Congress to do something about the 
“trusts” that were amassing fortunes 
for a few, but exploiting vast num-
bers of hard-working farmers and 
tradesmen.
Congress responded to this 
pressure by enacting the Sherman 
Antitrust Act in 1890. The name 
that soon attached to the legisla-
tion—“anti-trust”—reflected its goals. 
It was a tool to be used to combat the 
monopolistic abuses of very large 
enterprises. There was, however, no 
model for Congress to use in doing 
what it wanted to do—or wanted 
to appear to be doing. So Congress 
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“punted”—it simply federalized two 
barely used legal principles. It took 
two concepts from the common law 
that had been used for quite different 
purposes, first in England and then 
to a limited extent in the U.S., and it 
made them enforceable under fed-
eral law. The statute was very short, 
and its basics have not changed since 
1890. The first concept was “restraint 
of trade.” This concept had been 
used primarily in civil cases to com-
bat overly restrictive provisions in 
contracts. The second basic idea was 
“monopolization.” It had also been 
part of the English common law, but 
for centuries it had been little used 
in either England or the U.S. The leg-
islation contained virtually no guid-
ance as to the substantive content of 
the provisions, leaving issues of con-
tent to the federal courts.
The Sherman Act transformed 
the role of these private law concepts 
by providing that the federal govern-
ment could enforce them. Congress 
appears to have given little thought 
to how this was to take place. It did 
not create specific procedure for the 
enforcement of the antitrust provi-
sions. It merely authorized the U.S. 
Justice Department to file claims in 
the regular courts, using the normal 
rules for civil proceedings. Given that 
the federal government was still very 
small in 1890, the legislators could 
hardly have envisioned extensive 
federal administrative application of 
the provisions. Some assumed that 
private actions could be brought on 
the basis of the legislation, and this 
was confirmed a few years later.
This was the “shot in the dark!” 
The U.S. Congress was responding 
to specific domestic pressures. The 
legislators just took common law 
concepts and gave the federal gov-
ernment authority to use them in 
the federal courts. The legislators 
paid little, if any, attention to how 
others in the world had dealt with 
similar issues or what, if anything, 
they might think about the U.S. ex-
periment. They just experimented, 
basically relying on judges to sort 
out the issues and develop the law.
II. An Antitrust System Develops
Prior to the Second World War the system evolved slowly and 
fitfully according to a pragmatic, 
court-based process—typical of U.S. 
legal development generally. The 
judges were solving the conflicts be-
fore them, and there is little evidence 
that they thought about their deci-
sions as creating a “system” of an-
titrust law. They relied on accumu-
lated practical experience, domestic 
conceptions of the judicial role, and 
often on ideologies about the role 
of markets as they shaped the con-
tent and roles of antitrust in the U.S. 
There were relatively few cases, and 
other than in a few large companies 
there was relatively little interest in 
this area of the law.
After the war the roles and im-
portance of antitrust law expanded 
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greatly. One factor was transna-
tional. Antitrust came to be seen in 
the U.S. as a part of a global “mis-
sion” to provide an antidote to fas-
cism and to support freedom. Many 
believed that the concentrations of 
economic power in Germany and 
Japan were at least in part respon-
sible for the horrors of the Second 
World War, and they saw antitrust 
as a means of preventing such con-
centrations or at least curbing the 
resulting abuses. This led U.S. gov-
ernment officials and others actively 
to promote antitrust in Europe. A 
European version of antitrust law 
had begun to develop in the 1920s, 
but it had not gained much status in 
most European countries, and thus 
U.S. antitrust became a symbol of re-
structuring in Europe, both in indi-
vidual countries and in connection 
with the process of European inte-
gration. At the same time, the eco-
nomic and political dominance of 
the U.S. in the so-called “free world” 
allowed the U.S. to apply its antitrust 
law to conduct outside its own ter-
ritory and thus further support the 
antitrust mission.
This heightened political, sym-
bolic and economic importance of 
antitrust on the international plane 
combined with the de facto protec-
tion of the U.S. market encouraged 
rapid growth in the perceived impor-
tance of antitrust within the U.S. and 
the expansion of antitrust principles. 
By the early 1970s antitrust had be-
come a very important part of the 
legal environment of business and as 
such it attracted strong interest from 
lawyers. The growing importance of 
antitrust meant that law schools in-
creased their offerings in the area. 
According to Ralph Brill, antitrust was 
first taught at Chicago-Kent College 
of Law in 1973. This also meant, how-
ever, that antitrust represented a major 
cost for many U.S. businesses. These 
costs were tolerated as long as econom-
ic factors (especially currency and reg-
ulatory obstacles) buffered U.S. firms 
from international competition.
In the 1970s the international 
economic picture changed markedly, 
and these changes in global econom-
ic conditions generated a fundamen-
tal change in U.S. antitrust law. The 
“oil shocks” of the early 1970s and the 
concomitant international currency 
restructuring led to increased aware-
ness in the U.S. business communi-
ty of the need for U.S. businesses to 
compete internationally. Antitrust 
now began to appear as a burden on 
the U.S. economy, and this led schol-
ars to examine ever more carefully 
the intellectual justification for such 
burdens. Economists and law pro-
fessors increasingly argued that the 
courts had expanded antitrust law 
too far and that the entire edifice of 
antitrust law should be viewed from 
the perspective of its economic im-
pact. This perspective quickly won 
favor in the courts and law faculties, 
and  within a few years it led to a rad-
ical revision of standards for antitrust 
law in the U.S. The central substantive 
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law questions were now to be judged 
by economists according to economic 
criteria.
III. Global Competition Law Lead-
ership
The “shot in the dark” that was the U.S. antitrust law system is 
today no longer solely a domestic 
field of law. It is now also a critical-
ly important component of global 
economic policy! The system that 
U.S. judges had evolved to deal with 
purely domestic problems and that 
relied on little more than confidence 
in the capacity of courts to devel-
op reasonable responses to con-
flicts has been transformed into the 
central player in efforts to respond 
effectively to economic and other 
forms of globalization. It is now a 
U.S. export product, and the stakes 
are enormous. What directions and 
forms will the rules of competition 
take? Treatment of these issues will 
be a factor in the future of many 
countries, including the U.S., and 
for more than two decades Chica-
go-Kent has brought transnational 
competition law to our students, and 
Chicago-Kent faculty have contrib-
uted to the international discussion 
of these issues.
 
A. Foreign Interactions and Percep-
tions
 
U.S. antitrust now plays on a 
global stage, and much will depend 
on how foreign experts, lawyers, 
government officials and business 
leaders see U.S. antitrust. They will 
make decisions about what to do in 
their own countries and on the inter-
national level. This means that their 
perspectives on the U.S. system are 
critical to its roles both at home and 
abroad, and foreign images of U.S. 
antitrust have changed radically. Prior 
to the Second World War, those in 
Europe who knew anything about 
U.S. antitrust law (and they were 
few) generally considered it a mis-
take. They tended to see it as a fail-
ure that actually created more harm 
than good by forcing companies to 
merge rather than cooperate. This 
view predominated in large measure 
until after the Second World War. 
The Europeans were developing a 
different concept of competition law 
that emphasized administrative con-
trol of dominant firms. This concep-
tion of competition was spreading 
rapidly in Europe in the 1920s, but 
depression and war led to its virtual 
abandonment.
After that war ended, however, 
U.S. antitrust law became associated 
with U.S. economic dominance in 
the “free world.” The real and imag-
ined connections between economic 
concentration and military expan-
sion in both Germany and Japan 
convinced many that U.S.-style anti-
trust law should be used to combat 
such concentrations. U.S. occupa-
tion forces in Germany and Japan 
imposed U.S. antitrust ideas during 
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the occupation period, and the U.S. 
insisted that both countries either 
enact or maintain competition law 
after the occupation. This increased 
awareness of these ideas abroad. 
Perhaps more important, however, 
was the perception that antitrust 
was a source of strength for the U.S. 
economy and thus a potential spur 
to growth that other countries could 
employ.
U.S.-style antitrust did not, how-
ever, always fit well with European 
legal traditions and institutions, and 
in most European countries skepti-
cism toward the U.S. model limited 
progress in protecting competition. 
In Germany, however, a separate set 
of ideas about how to protect com-
petition developed in the 1930s and 
1940s in the underground, and af-
ter the war it became the basis for 
German antitrust law. From here 
it spread to the European level and 
became part of the process of Euro-
pean integration. The basic idea of 
U.S. antitrust law—i.e., protecting 
the competitive process from re-
straints—was part of this model of 
competition law, but the model itself 
was conceptually and institutionally 
quite distinct. European scholars and 
officials in these areas often looked 
to U.S. antitrust for comparisons and 
insights into problems, but there was 
relatively little interaction between 
U.S. and European forms of compe-
tition law until the 1990s.
In the 1990s these relationships 
became far closer and more import-
ant for both the U.S. and Europe-
ans. Moreover, the fall of the Soviet 
Union precipitated widespread in-
terest in market-based approaches 
around the world and revived the 
messianic tenor of the U.S. antitrust 
law community. Many countries 
that had socialist or other com-
mand-based approaches to the or-
ganization of economic activity now 
introduced antitrust laws or signifi-
cantly increased their investment in 
Title page of Control of the Market, by Bruce Wyman, 1911, Library of Congress.
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the enforcement of such laws. Often 
they looked to U.S. antitrust officials, 
lawyers and scholars for help in im-
plementing or evaluating their new 
activities.
B. Policy Issues and Obstacles
 
This has raised a critically im-
portant issue: How will/should 
competition law on global markets 
be implemented? Globalization has 
shown the limitations and distor-
tions of the traditional jurisdictional 
system—e.g., differing rules and 
procedures for different parts of the 
same economic market. Many in 
the U.S. and elsewhere believe that 
the best response to these problems 
is to encourage all countries to fol-
low at least the basic substantive law 
approach of the U.S. antitrust law 
system. This would generate conver-
gence among competition law sys-
tems around the world and reduce 
the harms caused by current jurisdic-
tional arrangements. Many others are, 
however, skeptical that the U.S. model 
should be the focus of convergence. 
They often see some form of coordina-
tion (perhaps at the World Trade Or-
ganization level) as the best response.
How these foreign decision mak-
ers and decision shapers understand 
and evaluate U.S. antitrust law is 
critical to this set of decisions. It is 
important, therefore, that they un-
derstand as clearly as possible how 
U.S. antitrust law works and what 
the guiding ideas are behind the law. 
Only then will they be in a position 
adequately to evaluate it, compare 
it with their own systems and make 
informed choices in relation to it. 
There are many obstacles—linguis-
tic, comparative, political and eco-
nomic—to achieving an adequate 
understanding of the U.S. system 
and of the implications of various 
policy choices for the global system 
and for individual components of it. 
Moreover, it is critical that U.S. law-
yers, officials and scholars acquire a 
better understanding of the compe-
tition law elsewhere and thus of the 
potential bases for convergence and 
coordination on the global level.
IV. Concluding Comments
A former U.S. antitrust official not long ago wrote that U.S. anti-
trust is (or could be) the “light of the 
world.” That might be a bit strong, 
but U.S. antitrust certainly does play 
a key role in the development of the 
global economy and its many com-
ponents. Now the big question is 
whether U.S. legal thinking and the 
creative and pragmatic impulses that 
have been so much a part of U.S. an-
titrust law will continue to provide 
the leadership that can make the 
most of these opportunities.
These changes have important 
implications for U.S. legal education. 
At Chicago-Kent College of Law, 
we are doing our part. Here, and 
at some other leading law schools, 
these issues have generated increas-
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ing attention. Since the 1980s, and 
even more so since the early 1990s, I and 
others have included transnational issues 
in the domestic antitrust course and 
included an antitrust focus in courses 
such as international business trans-
actions. I have also long offered a 
seminar in international and com-
parative antitrust law that tackles 
these issues directly. These efforts 
have two central objectives. One is 
to educate U.S. lawyers to perform 
more effectively in this new global 
context. The other is to educate for-
eign lawyers about U.S. antitrust law 
and provide them with tools for un-
derstanding and evaluating it and its 
global roles.
One fact stands out in 2013 at the 
celebration of Chicago-Kent’s 125 
years of teaching law. The U.S. will 
have to earn its leading role in anti-
trust law on the global level. Effec-
tive legal education in this area will 
be a key element in whether it will be 
successful in achieving that goal. ◆
David J. Gerber teaches antitrust law, 
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seminars such as international and com-
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elsewhere. His most recent book is Global 
Competition: Law, Markets and Globaliza-
tion (Oxford Univ. Press, 2010, pbk. 2012).
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